The Syrian Uprising: Part I, "The Nature of the Opposition Movement"

Syria is not Egypt, is not Tunisia, is not Libya, is not Iraq, is not Afghanistan. Getting a sense of the nature of the uprising will require a relatively detailed analysis that requires us to more-or-less throw out any preconceived model we have based on these previous uprisings. Let's take a look.

What we'll discuss over the next few posts:
1) The nature of the opposition movement.
2) The military reality on the ground.
3) Prospects for opposition victory.
4) Options for foreign powers and the directions the conflict could go.

Today, we're discussing: 1) The nature of the opposition movement.
Libya's opposition was largely regional: the east and west were largely separated by vast desert, and had developed very separate identities.
Bahrains was largely religious (Shiites dominated by Sunnis).
Afghanistan's is ethnic (mostly Pashtuns).
Iraq's was both ethnic and religious (Sunni Arabs dominated Shiite Arabs and Sunni Kurds).

Of course, the above descriptions are grossly oversimplified (Tripoli had major protests until they were quashed, for example), but give us an idea of where the base of power of the opposition movements come from.

The opposition movement in Syria appears to be primarily Sunni in nature (which is interesting in that Sunnis are the largest ethnic group in the country and the largest group represented by the government), and regionally diverse. If we use protester deaths as a proxy for the intensity of the opposition activity in Syria, we can see below that we have intense protests in all of Syria's major geographical areas, and that they do not focus on a particular religious area. Interestingly, we also don't see significant unrest in areas of Kurdish majority, which has been the case in neighboring Iraq & Turkey (although the Kurds are demanding greater rights & protection under the government).




There are scattered reports that the protesters have an anti-minority bend, particularly against Christians and Alawites. The opposition is, in turn, accusing the Assad government of inciting religious violence. It's not clear how much sectarian violence is actually happening, and how much of it (that is happening) is government-caused.

The demographic diversity of the movement helps us understand the nature of its political aims. The opposition, beyond calling for Assad to step down, is apparently seeking wider democratic reforms and civil rights. This has, of course, been the banner of the opposition movements in other countries, though the opposition groups do seem to be keeping in line with their original ideas so far.

The question for The West will be: is this an opposition that wants a liberal democracy, or one that wants a more Islamist democracy? The former will tend to be more Western-friendly, and the latter tends to be more at odds with US allies like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. It'll be tough to say--the Muslim Brotherhood definitely has a strong showing in the area, but in Syria, many other faces make up the various oppositions, and all sorts of strange alliances might arise (and, to be fair, the Muslim Brotherhood is relatively moderate).

So, to some extent, there is a wait-and-see on the political reality of this opposition movement, just as there has been in previous revolutions across the Middle East.

But before we think about it too hard, we need to get a good sense of the military reality on the ground in Syria, which we'll discuss next time.

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Foreign Interests in the North Korean Power Transition

Kim Jong Il is dead. His son, Kim Jong Un is taking over.

At least, we think so.

The North Korean regime is run, essentially, by a military oligarchy. Generals and other high-ranking officials tend to garner strong loyalties by their troops, and thus have the power to enforce their wishes.

It is thus possible for military leaders to try to stage a coup or otherwise disrupt the government if they are unhappy (we've discussed this before after the Cheoan incident). The danger in the death of Kim Jong Il is that North Korea's military leadership may not be happy with Kim Jong Un as the new leader of the country. He is young, untested, and apparently a bit unsocial and reclusive. In any such transition (even if not to a leader that is particularly inept), the temporary weakness of loyalty and stability could prompt a move by one of these military leaders.

This stability risk is the source of the various approaches of various major powers that have an interest in North Korea. For the most part, these countries want to avoid war and chaos. Each has its own particular stake:

China: Like in the Cheoan incident, China will be backing Kim in order to preserve stability. Its very strong, quick backing shows that it will put its weight behind Kim in order to deter actors within North Korea from attempting a coup. A war in North Korea would mean a major refugee influx into China, which it is not at all prepared to handle.

Japan & South Korea: Japan and South Korea are showing some warmth in working to keep the region stable, as well. Japan is working with China directly, highlighted by a recent high-level diplomatic visit. Japan risks being at the wrong end of ballistic missiles that North Korea has aimed at the country that could be taken over by military factions even less interested in stability than Kim was (again, see the Cheoan incident). South Korea actually sent mourners to North Korea to express regrets for Kim Jong Il's death. The move is designed to start off on the right foot with the new regime and express an interest in potentially working together. South Korea not only faces the refugee threat that North Korea does, but also potentially a direct invasion if the wrong military leaders take power. It also, long-term, seeks unification with the North, and may be testing the waters to see how Kim Jong Un responds.

Russia: Russia has been quietly supportive. It is currently looking inward at its own protests, and to its WTO ascension, and may partially be distracted. Additionally, it does not want to be too closely associated with North Korea (it gets little out of its relationship with North Korea other than North Korea can prove a useful distraction against the United States and its allies), but similarly wants stability on the peninsula.

United States: The United States sees the transition as an opportunity to resume the six-party talks aimed at dismantling the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Expect the United States to show the most aggressive posture of any of the six-party members, but it will take some time before Japan and South Korea are ready to negotiate hard with Kim. That said, the United States making its intentions clear early on can slowly and steadily build momentum.

Kim Jong Un was placed in the seat of successor very quickly, after Kim Jong Il's older two sons became politically unpopular by various means--for example, Jong Un is a 4-star general despite no military experience at all. The posturing is meant, in some ways, to project to the world that North Korea is united in its choice for successor. Some factions may be looking for an opportunity to unseat Jong Un, but so far it looks like enough military leaders of the country are behind him to give him legitimacy, and that legitimacy will grow if he plays his cards well with the great powers around him--and they'll be looking to support him unless he turns out particularly rotten.

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The Aftermath of Europe's Disintegration

Dear Readers,

I apologise for my long absence from the blog. I've been busy, but I've also been holding back and feeling out the European situation before I wanted to say anything definitive about it.

As the European Debt Crisis worsens, we are starting to see the fault lines in the "Blocanization" of Europe grow wider and deeper. The core EU is torn between total control of its periphery, and jettisoning it completely. The former Soviet bloc countries continue to huddle together, waiting to ride out the eurozone storm and hold the Russians at bay when they come to capitalize on the fracturing of the Eurozone. Turkey's previous desperate love affair with the EU has become nearly a joke.

In the end, we're seeing Europe, as a concept, fall apart. The EU still exists, but it may dissolve in the next few years. If Greece or Italy leave, it will set a precedent that countries like the Czech republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom (all of whom have grown massively Euroskeptical) may take on and jump ship. This will happen, without a doubt, before any of these countries allow themselves to be pulled down by the Eurozone's debt crisis.

Even if these countries don't leave, they'll weaken the EU and make sure they are not as dependent on the fiscal responsibility of periphery countries in the region. Nationalism is coming back in Europe, and with ferocity. This nationalism, which many thought was being eroded away by Pan-Europeanism, will lead to European countries acting, once again, as independent entities, rather than a united force.

Geopolitically, it eliminates Europe from contestants for the role of 21st century hegemony. Despite its national pessimism, the United States is once again the front-runner--it remains the center of gravity of world trade and commands the seas. A growing Russia may be able to challenge the United States over the next 50 years. China continues to focus inwardly, and risks its own end similar to the "Japanese Miracle" if it cannot navigate its way out of the toughest bubbles in world history.

Look for surges in activity and influence-building from all three of these nations in the next decade or so, as they try to feel out what the new geopolitical system is going to look like.

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Highlight: A Fractured Anti-American Islamist Movement

Al Qaeda released an article in its English newsletter Inspire calling Iran's President Ahmedinijad a conspiracy theorist, and that he should stop blaming the US for 9/11.

This is more than just boasting by Al-Qaeda. It's not simply that they want the credit for the attack on the WTC, but specifically, they want to be distanced from the US. Inadvertently, Ahmedinijad is claiming that Al-Qaeda are collaborators with the US, rather than sworn enemies. If the US was involved in a coordinated way, it would undermine Al-Qaeda's anti-US credibility.

Even if Ahmedinijad claims the US wasn't coordinating actively with Al-Qaeda, but simply knew about it beforehand and prepped for the attack, it would undermine Al-Qaeda's credibility in effective attacks. If 9/11's mastery was really at the hands of the US, then Al-Qaeda has summarily failed to attack the US on its soil since 1993 (which was ineffectual at best).

The split is a sign that different Islamist groups, while anti-American, are far from being able to unite in the cause. It's a sign that US foreign policy--to keep the Middle East broken up and fractured--is working.

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Libya Mop Up: What's Taking the NTC So Long?

A few readers have asked, "Why is the NTC taking so long to capture Bani Walid and Sirte?"



Great question, and (luckily) simple answer.

Sun Tzu mentioned that you always want to give an enemy the ability to retreat. If not, they'll fight to the last man, taking many of you with them.

In past battles, Gaddafi forces have had the ability to retreat, and chose it, rather than be overwhelmed and destroyed, in the hopes of being able to reorganize and counter-attack.

All of Gaddafi's remaining forces are in these two cities, and they have nowhere to retreat to. They will need to be completely destroyed (surrendering counts) in order for the NTC to take these cities, which will be expensive and painful.

But ultimately, it is inevitable. The Gaddafi forces in Sirte have no supply lines and will fall to a siege. But, knowing this, they are likely to try to launch a counter-attack against NTC forces rather than be starved out. It's unclear whether NTC forces have significant reserves to deal with a counter-attack. Some rumors fly that they're stretched thin and are low on ammunition, but it's a game they're going to win in the long-term.

The problem is that people hate waiting.

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Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia

1) The Visegrad 4: Eastern Europe as a Major Player
2) The Re-Emergent Russian Bloc
3) Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia
4) The EU Periphery: "Core" EU's Albatross
5) The Atlantics: A Return to Arms-Length Continental Management

Dear readers,

Sorry about the wait. Today we conclude our 5-part series on the Blocanization of Europe with our final installment: Baltic Solidarity to an Emerging Russia.



The Baltics have worried about Russia for a long time, likely surprising nobody. When Russia looks west, it sees both vulnerability and opportunity. Its vulnerability comes from open plains stretching from Moscow all the way to the Alps, giving potential invaders an easy route in (which we've seen taken advantage of many times), as well as St. Petersburg being potentially bottled up by European maritime powers in the Baltic sea. Russia thus seeks to create buffer space and exert influence over its western neighbors in order to protect its land and sea periphery.

The opportunities are in natural resources (Finnish timber, Norwegian oil, etc). Russia has made moves to squeeze control of these resources or the processing of them out of the Nordic holders.

So Russia has thus spent most of the 20th and 21st centuries attempting to exert control over these areas to in order to protect itself and realize financial opportunities.

So the Baltics have been traditionally fearful. Much like the V4, their faith in NATO has started to erode. Estonia has been the constant victim of political manipulation and cyber-attacks for a decade; Finland has been pressed by tariffs.

So the rest of the story is short. The Baltic countries are looking to each other for solidarity, especially military. Sweden and Norway sport surprisingly powerful military forces that will make any incursions by Russia a much more painful contest than the invasion of Georgia.

In particular, Sweden and Poland are discussing potential alliance-making; nothing as strong as the V4 itself or the Baltic's grouping, but something that could potentially functionally replace NATO altogether.

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