A Brief on Honduras

You might be wondering what the heck has happened in Honduras that got the international community so excited. Frankly, coups were like Thursday Meatloaf in Latin America through the 1980s, and as much as there was always a bunch of sabre-rattling, they only generated serious attention as far as they upset the geopolitical and ideological balance.

The coup in Honduras is being wildly condemned by leftist governments; Nicaragua and Venezeuala are both going so far as to threaten war (Venezeula would have to deploy boats and planes of excessive quantity to do this, and would almost certainly irk the US beyond what they're capable of); Nicaragua has moved troops to the Honduras border. And President Obama himself has condemned the coup as undemocratic, but has not said much beyond that.

Frankly, the Honduras coup is rather ambiguous. Zelaya's extended-term stunt clearly contradicted the constitution, and the Constitutional Court told him to cut it--he didn't. So what then? Impeachment isn't actually an option in the Honduran constitution, and much like the Marshall Court of the US, the Army improvised and got rid of him. Was he becoming a Chavez-style tyrant? Maybe, but precedent is important. That said, they did use the force of violence to oust him, and imposed their own "interim government." Perhaps talking about it a bit longer might have been polite.

So my personal feelings on the coup are a bit ambivalent. I agree Zeyala needed to go, but the way of taking him out was perhaps not spectacular. But what other options were there? I'd love to hear what you guys think in comments.

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Thoughts on the Helmand Offensive

It's getting... some news. Not too much.

But it's the biggest military offensive in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001, and the stakes are high. The outcome is important. The implications will be enormous.

The whole thing smells a bit sweetly of a General Petraeus plot. Large surge of troops, offensive against the seriously bad guys, and long-term boots on the ground to provide security and institutional organization where there is a vacuum. Petraeus trained the US army in doubling as a low-level government, and those skills will be critical in winning the long-term security of the province. Hearts-and-minds.

It is very hard, to say the least, to tell how the offensive is going. Bad guys are dying, good guys are dying. The folks in Helmand aren't sure whether they're more angered by the presence of the Taliban or the presence of foreign troops.

But if US marines and UK army troops are able to achieve victory (loosely defined as restoring peace and security to the region), then a number of benefits follow:

1) Helmand and Kandahar will be more secure areas in which the US can operate and prevent Taliban from pouring across the border during the Waziristan operation in Pakistan. This is critical. If Helmand and Kandahar remain in Taliban hands, then even a successful assault in Waziristan will be worth little to the long-term war against the Taliban. On the other hand, if the US and UK can hold the area and patrol the border, then they will pinch the largest concentration of Taliban in the entire Afpak region, and have a good shot at delivering the first crushing blow in a very long time. But these Taliban are wiser, tougher, and smarter than their brethren out in Swat, and will not go down so easily.

2) Voting in the area will be secure. Giving the Pashtun majority the ability to vote in full (where currently the only secure voting areas are in northern, non-Pashtun areas) will legitimize the election and potentially prevent post-election violence.

3) The ISAF will strike a significant psychological blow to the Taliban--and bolster the confidence of anti-Taliban citizens in Afghanistan, much like the Pakistani assault in Swat did. The ISAF needs to regain the momentum of this war; the Taliban can out-wait foreigners rather indefinitely if it is not soundly beaten.

Losing, of course, means that the momentum is very squarely in the hands of the Taliban. But, frankly, the US and UK are unlikely to simply give up this fight--they will stick around and make life rather difficult for the Taliban for a long time. Total defeat seems unlikely, and they should at least be able to operate with enough presence to support the Waziristan assault in Pakistan (at which point the US should have an easier time "mopping up" Helmand and Kandahar, as the Taliban will have no safe zones). It may be messy and long, but I believe the US is likely to turn a victory here.

But if it doesn't, serious questions will be asked about whether it is worth it to stick around much longer.

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Speculating on US-Pakistani Cooperation

The evidence that the US and Pakistan are coordinating quietly in the tribal border regions of the Pakistani state is increasing. Increased US drone attacks suggest both permission and intelligence from the Pakistani army--these attacks provide the Army with not only a great psychological advantage (previously safe spots are no longer safe for the Taliban), but a tactical one (they frequently enough kill enemy commanders). Precision strikes by the Pakistani Army suggest US aerial and satellite intelligence in real-time, allowing jets and artillery to pinpoint their attacks.

The "softening" operation has prompted the Taliban in Waziristan to abandon a peace agreement they had with the government (which, frankly, I did not know was officially in place at all). Such an abandonment will mean more attacks on civilians--and if they come quickly, the Army will be forced to act more quickly than it might otherwise like. But with the spectre of civilian deaths hanging over the Army, they will utilize their American allies more to hit the Taliban hard and keep them off-balance as the Pakistani Army prepares for its assault in Waziristan.

The Pakistani assault is not, contrary to my expectations, caused NATO casualties to go down: this month was the worst in almost a year. But I have been reminded that casualty-counting during a surge in troop activity provides a false comparison: there are more troops more actively and aggressively deployed now than before, and casualties can sometimes be a sign of intense forward activity rather than enemy success. But the real US opportunity will come after a successful Waziristan assault, and the US is going to do anything it can to help that happen.

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All Doors Closed in Tehran

Yesterday, Khamenei announced that the regime would support election results against "any cost;" today, the Guardian Council announced that the partial recount re-affirmed Ahmedinejad's victory, despite admitted irregularities that included 50 cities in Iran having more votes than registered voters, and 3 million "mystery votes."

The leadership has, obviously, eliminated all political options for overturning the results of the election. Protests continued today, but they were apparently quite violently broken up by Basij and riot police that outnumbered the protesters approximately 2 to 1.

At this point, continuing protesters have no realistic chance at achieving an outcome close to what they want, but many will certainly want to continue to defame and illegitimize the regime in the long-term, both domestically and internationally. The toughest part of such a strategy is that the only weapon a protester can use to fight the regime is, ultimately, his or her own body.

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Pakistan Prepares to Assault Waziristan

After 8 years of absurd domestic politics that can be most briefly described as "bullshit," the past few months in Pakistan have been a dramatic and critical turnaround in the very frustrating war on the Taliban. While Swat valley is not yet a thriving pillar of liberty, justice, and security, the Taliban spine in the area has been broken (though, let me say, Taliban spines have had a very odd history of remote post-mortem reassembly). But the Pakistani army is, cleverly, recruiting former People's Militiamen and those whose lives were most thoroughly destroyed by the Taliban to become a loyal local police force that will not only keep these people fed (hearts & minds!) but, more importantly, provide a presence that will be difficult for the Taliban to overcome.

Next: Waziristan. Waziristan is a much bigger and more daunting challenge for the Pakistani Army. Waziristan serves as the primary base of operations for the Afghani Taliban--they fled after the 2001 US invasion and set up shop in this rough, tribal area; they have acted with relative impunity since. The area is full of tribalists who are quite used to their autonomy, and do not like state intervention--unlike the people of Swat, they will not be welcoming the Pakistani Army with open arms. There are many more Taliban per capita, they are more entrenched, and they know the terrain a whole lot better than the Army. And, unlike Swat, they will not give up easily--where would they go?

But here, close to the Afghani border, Pakistan has the advantage of extensive NATO intelligence, support, and firepower. NATO will almost certainly press from the north right to the border, and happily shoot across. The Taliban will need to fear drones and incoming missiles if they expose their positions in order to attack the invading Pakistani Army. The Taliban can dissolve and try to fight an insurgency, but like Swat, psychology may limit their ability to so quickly give up control of the area for a more tactically advantageous (but very, very long-term) strategy. If they hold firm, they will inflict casualties, but if the Pakistani Army can withstand those casualties, the likely-firm stance of the Taliban will shatter.

Now, it is not entirely clear this will work--the last time the Pakistani Army ventured into Waziristan, they were crushed, and left with tail between legs. But this will be different, for a number of reasons:

1) Public opinion gives the Pakistani Army the political capital it needs to both bring many troops and inflict some local civilian casualties.
2) The Pakistani Army has new leadership that is making much better use of its array of options--standard troops, paramilitary guards, commandos, airpower, etc.
3) The Pakistani Army has the political ability to cooperate with the US in this operation. That will be a huge advantage.
4) Without Swat, the Taliban is a bit off-balance. As they run out of alternative safe-havens, they have fewer places to re-group, train, supply, etc, for long-term campaigns.

The Pakistani Army is trying to soften up the positions of Talibani commander and al-Qaeda ally Meshud with airpower. Current militant casualties are estimated at about 50, which isn't many, but is enough to shake the Taliban a bit. If the Pakistani Army can continue to inflict such casualties using long-range attacks, the psychological implications (especially for a force that has enjoyed peace in its home base) will be significant.

As the Army hits the heavy enclaves of the Taliban, citizens militias are actually forming around the northwest and working with paramilitary/police to trap, separate, and kill extremists that had over-extended in attempts to push their influence further into Pakistan. Such militias may be self-propagating--stories of success may encourage otherwise fence-sitting men to take arms to help, giving them an even greater advantage. If nothing else, they will provide serious disruption to the physical network of Taliban between their strongholds, giving the Army a much-needed logistical advantage.

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Team Mousavi Prepares for Martyrdom

After being told that death was the punishment for further disruption, Mousavi and thousands of protesters came back for more, clashing with riot police and the Basij. There are sporadic reports of capsicum (pepper spray) being dumped from helicopters to break up the crowd, reports of gunfire, and numbers of violent clashes that have apparently left hundreds of riot police injured. Busses, cars, motorcycles, mosques, and the Ahmedinejad supporters' Headquarters have all been set on fire. The Shrine of Khomeini has been bombed by a suicide bomber,

Sporadic clashes continue, though the police seem to have managed to break up much of it without actually killing protesters--excellent execution on their part.

But it is highly unclear that the regime has ended the protests, or seriously slowed them down. @BreakingNews on Twitter had the following:

"BULLETIN -- IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADER MOUSAVI SAYS HE IS "READY FOR MARTYRDOM" AND WILL CONTINUE HIS PATH."

There is almost certainly a hardcore group of protesters ready to follow him to the end (see last post). They will continue to make life incredibly difficult for the regime until they are rounded up.

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